

Message Text

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SUBJ: CSCE: US BRIEFING AT NAC DISCUSSION OCTOBER 29 ON SECRETARY'S
TALKS IN MOSCOW

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

FOR AMBASSADOR SHERER

BEGIN SUMMARY: ON OCTOBER 29 COUNSELOR SONNENFELDT AND ASSISTANT
SECRETARY HARTMAN BRIEFED THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON SECRETARY
KISSINGER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IN MOSCOW.
TRANSMITTED BELOW IS THE CSCE PORTION OF THE OCTOBER 29 NAC
DISCUSSIONS. END SUMMARY

SONNENFELDT EXPLAINED THAT AT THE OUTSET OF HIS MEETINGS WITH THE
SECRETARY, BREZHNEV HAD RECITED A SERIES OF COMPLAINTS ABOUT
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS. PRIMARY SOVIET
GRIEVANCES WERE IN THE AREAS OF TRADE RELATIONS AND IN EMIGRATION
MATTERS, PARTICULARLY THE HIGH DEGREE OF PUBLIC ATTENTION IN
THE UNITED STATES ON THE KISSINGER/JACKSON EXCHANGE OF COR-
RESPONDENCE. IN ATTEMPTING TO EXPLAIN WHY BREZHNEV HAD OPENED
THE DISCUSSIONS IN THIS WAY, SONNENFELDT RECALLED THAT THE SOVIETS
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HAVE TRADITIONALLY SOUGHT TO PUT THEIR NEGOTIATING PARTNER AT
A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISADVANTAGE AS AN OPENING PLOY. ON THE OTHER HAND,
GIVEN BREZHNEV'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO AND STAKE IN THE US/SOVIET
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, IT IS QUITE LIKELY THAT HIS RECITATION
OF COMPLAINTS WAS AN ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE NEW US

ADMINISTRATION INTENDED ANY CHANGES IN THE US/USSR RELATIONSHIP. AMONG THE LESSER GRIEVANCES CITED BY BREZHNEV, E.G., THE US/SOVIET GRAIN DEAL, BREZHNEV ALSO RAISED THE TRADITIONAL SOVIET COMPLAINT THAT THE CSCE WAS TAKING TOO LONG AND THAT THE US WAS NOT BEING SUFFICIENTLY ACTIVE IN WORKING TOWARD AN EARLY CONCLUSION.

2. IN A FURTHER MEETING DEVOTED EXCLUSIVELY TO CSCE, THE US MADE THE POINT TO THE SOVIETS THAT IT BELIEVED THE REMAINING ISSUES ON BASKET I PRINCIPLES, I.E. THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF PRINCIPLES, THEIR EQUAL VALIDITY, AND LANGUAGE COVERING PEACEFUL CHANGE OF FRONTIERS, WERE ALL MATTERS ON WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD ACCEPT EARLY RESOLUTION. SONNENFELDT INFORMED THE COUNCIL OF THE US ASSUMPTION THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD DISCUSS THE PEACEFUL CHANGE ISSUE WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, WE HAD NOT THEREFORE TAKEN A MORE ACTIVE OR DETAILED POSITION ON THIS MATTER IN MOSCOW SINCE IT IS OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO THE FRG. THE UNITED STATES IS WILLING TO SUPPORT THE FRG POSITION ON THESE ISSUES, HOWEVER, AND CAN ACCEPT WHATEVER COMPROMISE IS WORKED OUT BETWEEN BONN AND MOSCOW

3. THE US ALSO URGED GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON CSCE BASKET III ISSUES, BUT DID NOT ENTER INTO SPECIFICS. SIMILARLY, THE US HAD URGED THE SOVIETS TO MOVE ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES BUT HAD NOT ENTERED INTO SPECIFIC DETAILS. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE MOSCOW CONVERSATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE IMPATIENT AND WANT TO CONCLUDE THE CSCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE UNITED STATES HAD SUGGESTED TO THE SOVIETS THAT IT TOO WAS INTERESTED IN SEEING IN CONFERENCE ISSUES COULD BE MOVED ALONG, BUT THE US HAD MADE ABSOLUTELY NO COMMITMENT TO THE SOVIETS ON THE DATE AND LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION IN CSCE STAGE III.

4. SONNENFELDT TOLD THE COUNCIL THE UNITED STATES HOPED THAT, PERHAPS BY THE END OF 1974 OR EARLY 1975, THE ALLIES COULD TAKE STOCK ON HOW CSCE MIGHT BE CONCLUDED AND HOW IT RELATES TO OTHER ONGOING EAST/WEST NEGOTIATIONS LIKE MBFR AND SALT. HE

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SUGGESTED THAT THE ALLIES "GEAR THEIR MINDS" TO A REVIEW OF THE WHOLE ISSUE EARLY IN 1975 AFTER THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL MEETING.

5. DURING THE QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION FOLLOWING THE US PRESENTATION, BELGIAN PERMREP, DESTAERCKE, OBSERVED THAT MOSCOW SEEMED TO THINK AN EARLY CONCLUSION OF CSCE IS POSSIBLE, WHILE IN GENEVA THE SOVIETS HAD INCREASED THEIR RIGIDITY. HE WONDERED, THEREFORE, IF THERE WERE NOT A MISUNDERSTANDING SOMEWHERE.

6. IN REPLY TO DESTAERCKE, SONNENFELDT NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD FOR SOME TIME TAKEN THE LINE THAT THE MAJOR QUESTIONS IN CSCE ARE ALREADY SETTLED. BREZHNEV IN PARTICULAR IS IMPATIENT. HE BELIEVES THAT BASKET III IS UNIMPORTANT, THAT BASKET I CONTAINS ONLY TWO OUTSTANDING ISSUES WHICH SHOULD BE SETTLED ON SOVIET TERMS. SO THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION FROM THE SOVIET VIEWPOINT.

THE SOVIETS HAVE RECENTLY MADE SOME EFFORT IN GENEVA TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY, BUT THAT EFFORT IS INSUFFICIENT. HARTMAN ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN PUZZLED ALL ALONG ABOUT HOW TO DEAL PROCEDURALLY WITH BASKET III ISSUES. THEY ARE LOOKING FOR SOME METHOD, AND HAVE HEARD OF THE EFFORTS OF THE NEUTRALS IN THIS REGARD. THE SOVIETS MAY NOW BE WONDERING IF THERE IS MOVEMENT TOWARD PUTTING TOGETHER SOMETHING THAT THEY CAN MORE EASILY LIVE WITH.

7. THE ITALIAN PERMREP, CATALANO, ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAD RAISED A POSSIBLE LINK BETWEEN CSCE AND MBFR. SONNENFELDT REPLIED THAT THIS SUBJECT HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED.

8. THE CANADIAN PERMREP (MENZIES) ASKED WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE LESSONS FOR THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE US EXPERIENCE OF LINKING THE TRADE AND EMIGRATION ISSUE. PERHAPS THE WEST MIGHT SEEK TO LINK BASKETS II AND III BY GIVING BASKET II INTERIM APPLICATIONS, SAY 18 MONTHS, SO AS TO SEE HOW THE RUSSIANS PERFORM ON BASKET III.

9. SONNENFELDT SAID HE WAS INTERESTED BUT SKEPTICAL OF AMBASSADOR MENZIES' THEORY ABOUT TIEING BASKET II TO BASKET III. ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE LINKING OF SOVIET EMIGRATION POLICY TO US TRADE POLICY WAS A UNIQUE SITUATION. THE WEST MUST AVOID BECOMING "MARXIST" IN ITS APPROACH TO TRADE POLICY. MOREOVER, IT IS UNREALISTIC TO THINK THAT WE ARE GOING TO CHANGE THE SOVIET SYSTEM

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OR BRING ABOUT SIGNIFICANT MODIFICATIONS IN SOVIET SOCIETY BY USING TRADE CONCESSIONS AS LEVERAGE. SONNENFELDT ADMITTED THAT THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY WAS STRONG, BUT ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRICE THEY ARE PREPARED TO PAY FOR IT HAS LIMITS. MR. SONNENFELDT SAID HIS OWN PERSONAL OPINION WAS THAT LINKING BASKET II WITH BASKET III WOULD ONLY SERVE TO PROVOKE SOVIET SENSITIVITIES. HE ASKED HARTMAN TO COMMENT.

10. HARTMAN SAID THAT THE SOVIET DESIRE TO DEAL ON THE EMIGRATION ISSUE WAS INFLUENCED BY THEIR DESIRE TO MOVE AHEAD ON OTHER ISSUES. IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECALL THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WAS OPPOSED TO THIS LINKAGE BUT THE MATTER WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S HANDS. HARTMAN DID NOT THINK IT WAS A GOOD IDEA TO INVOKE LINKAGE IN THE CSCE CONTEXT.

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